The U. S. has wasted its “subprime” mortgage crisis. The story of how and why this has happened is of interest not only for its own stake, but for the broader themes it reveals. I am a theoretically trained economist who started investigating US housing finance markets more than 20 years ago.

美國未能汲取“次貸"危機的教訓。不僅次貸危機本身的發生過程和原因值得關注，其所揭示的更廣泛議題同樣值得考察。我是一名有理論功底的經濟學家，20多年前便開始研究美國房地產金融市場。

Nobel laureate Ro, Shiller and i separately made proposals to reduce systemic risk in the market. Yet our reform efforts went nowhere during the good times. We could not grab scarce public, press, or political attention with the claim that an apparently well- functioning system was profoundly flawed.

諾貝爾獎獲得者佑特.席和我分別提出降低市場系統風險的建議。但是，在經濟繁榮景氣的時代，我們的改革提議白費唇舌。我們認為，當時表面運轉良好的市場系統，實際上卻千瘡百孔，公眾、傳媒和政界對我們的觀點置若罔聞。

Naively as it turned out, we each believed that the housing finance crash might finally cause more fundamental questions to be asked. After all, our ideas on risk sharing were directly relevant and would have lessened the impact of the crash. We each made specific proposals to speed recovery from the crash. For a while it seemed as if there would be real progress. Our hope was short-lived. Nothing positive has come out of the “subprime" crisis. The changes that have been made treat the nature and ignore the illness.

我們天真地以為，房地產金融危機也許終于會讓人們提出更根本、更核心的問題。畢竟，我們關于分擔風險的想法與此直接相關，并且會減輕危機的破壞力。我們分別提出危機后加快復蘇進程的具體建議。曾有一度，我們似乎真的取得了進步，但我們的希望只是曇花一現：次貸危機沒有帶來任何積極的改變。所有的改革一直是治標不治本。

The US housing finance system is in worse shape than ever. The policy reform process is broken, and there is no quick fix sight. The breakdown of the reform process is simple to understand as it is tragic. Public servants can all too easily prevent experts from judging their performance. This leaves an inexpert press and a readily distracted public as the only sources of reformist pressure. The press commentates on policy responses based on ideological mandates from an ideological readership. The public tweets approval. Unexamined, institutions and opinions continue to ossify.

目前美國房地產金融系統的狀況空前惡劣。政策改革進程中斷，也看不到能快速解決問題的補救辦法。改革進程停滯的原因很容易理解，也很可悲。公務員很輕易地就能規避老師評判其工作表現，這使得不專業的媒體和容易分心的公眾成為僅有的改革壓力的來源。媒體從意識形態受眾的角度對基于意識形態的政策反饋發表評論。公眾在推特發文表示贊成，而機構和輿論不經斟酌，繼續固守成規。

The problem is deep and pervasive. Many policy-makers have much to fear from exposing their activities to experts who might attract public attention to their failings. Without experts, their performance simply cannot be assessed. This liberates spinners, which is positive for most in the press whose technical training leaves them unable to sort through the competing claims of knowledgeable experts and less knowledgeable policy-makers and pundits.

問題非常嚴重，而且普遍存在。許多決策者非常擔心把活動曝光給老師后可能使民眾注意到他們的失敗。沒有老師，他們的表現便無法得到評估。這讓編故事的人獲得了解放-大多數媒體中都確實存在這樣的角色-他們所接受的技術訓練有限，無法分辨博學的老師和不那么博學的決策者以及權威們各持己見的說法。

Even when reform is called for, it is impossible to effectively monitor implementation when experts are kept at arms’ length. Let me return briefly to the case of US housing finance policy. One must predict that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA will survive unscathed. Without fundamental re-thinking, risks will be allowed to multiply unseen. The seeds are even now being sowed for the housing crash of 2025 - 35 and the bailout of 2027-37.

即使民眾要求變革，如果老師只是隔山打牛，也不可能有效監控改革的實施。讓我迅速回到美國房地產金融政策一事吧。人們預測房利美公司、房地美公司和聯邦住房管理局肯定會安然無恙地度過危機：但是如果人們沒有根本性的反思，風險仍會在不知不覺中蔓延，甚至現在就已經埋下了2025至2035年房地產市場暴跌和2027至2037年救助的種子。